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Market-Driven Management:  









The  first  policy  implication  of  the  diffusion  of  a  Market-Driven  Management 
approach is the same as the spreading of globalization, i.e. the obsolescence of 
industrial policies as traditionally designed and managed by Nation-States with the 
established toolbox of protectionism and subsidies, picking ‘national champions’, 
etc. 
The growing asymmetry between the physical jurisdiction of political bodies and 
the  global  operation  space  of  modern  corporations  feeds  the  apparent  trend 
toward company ‘denationalization’. 
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1. The Survival of the ‘Weak State’ 
 
Which  are  the  policy  implications  of  such  a  substantial  re-orientation  in 
interpreting  corporate  behavior  such  as  the  one  suggested  by  market-driven 
management (MDM) (Lambin, 2000; Brondoni and Lambin, 2001; Webster, 2002; 
Brondoni, 2007)? If industrial policy is the way States try to interfere with the 
structure,  conduct  and  performance  of  companies  and  industries  in  pursuit  of 
‘superior’ collective goals (growth, development, power etc.), then a significant 
change in the way companies perceive themselves and their relationship with the 
market  cannot  be  without  consequences  for  the  way  governments  shape  their 
industrial policies. In this paper I intend to provide a rough sketch and a short and 
preliminary discussion of the policy implications of the MDM approach. 
MDM is tightly linked to the full realization of the globalization process. On the 
one  hand,  this  long-term,  demand-centered  strategic  approach  can  be  most 
profitable within truly global markets; on the other hand, this approach contributes 
actively to globalization, by defeating protectionism. Unsurprisingly, then, the first 
policy implication of the diffusion of a MDM approach is the same as the spreading 
of globalization, i.e. the obsolescence of industrial policies as traditionally designed 
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and managed by Nation-States with the established toolbox of protectionism and 
subsidies, picking ‘national champions’, etc. 
The growing asymmetry between the physical jurisdiction of political bodies and 
the global operation space of modern corporations feeds the apparent trend toward 
company  ‘denationalization’.  Denationalization  does  not  mean  the  full  loss  of 
national reference as in an imaginary ‘Cosmocorp’ (Ball, 1967). However the ‘Who 
is us?’ (Reich, 1991) syndrome emphasizes that it is impossible to define in an 
automatic and unambiguous way the nationality of companies within the global 
economy  in  terms  of  headquarters  or  plant  location,  or  owners’  or  workers’ 
nationality.  There  is  no  obvious  relationship  between  company  and  collective 
interests in the global economy. 
Within this scenario we can easily expect a weakening of Nation States and of 
their ability to promote economic development by directing companies (dirigisme). 
This is neither a new trend nor a new prediction. ‘Weak States’ (Crozier, 1987; 
Atkinson and Coleman, 1989) have been essential to the neo-liberal consensus, 
which  has  dominated  economic  policy  since  the  1980s  (and  even  earlier), 
encouraging  a sometimes naïve and mostly ideological end-of-history syndrome 
(Bellini, 2000). 
The State not only has survived, but is hardly confined within the boundaries set 
by  neo-classical  economic  orthodoxy  through  the  theory  of  ‘market  failures’ 
(Stiglitz, 1989). Of course, in an era of globalization States are less and less taking 
‘whether  choices’  (whether  to  accept  integration  in  the  international  economy, 
whether to promote technological innovation etc.), but complex ‘how issues’ are 
still to be faced: about the speed, the paths, the sustainability etc. (Schmitz, 2007). 
The Mercantilist chromosomes of economic policy (the equation between wealth 
and  power  that  has  always  provided,  and  still  provides,  more  than  enough 
justification  for  State  involvement  in  the  economy)  are without doubt also still 
there (Bellini, 1996). Any ‘report of death’ would be - borrowing from Mark Twain 
- ‘an exaggeration’. 
One should not underestimate the ability of the State to change and adapt to the 
new scenarios of globalization. This has occurred, first of all, through the reshaping 
of the role of the State and of its policy styles. This phenomenon can be described 
as a shift away from patterns of policy making that assumed, at least in abstract 
terms,  a  capacity  to  control  (if  not  command)  private  business  on  the  basis  of 
explicit and formalized powers. Policy styles then emerge that are characterized by 
informality, flexibility, the search for consensus and market conformity (i.e. policy 
additionality  with  minimum  interference  in  the  market  mechanism,  not  mere 
subsidiarity).  The  apparatus  of  the  States  is  progressively  shaped  with  reduced 
attention to guaranteeing close co-ordination and unitary command of a wide range 
of policy tools (like in the widely discussed ‘MITI model’, reflecting the Japanese 
experience  of  the  1980s:  Johnson,  1982).  Governments  thus  focus  on  better 
guaranteeing  the  learning  process  (‘intelligent  governments’),  the  continuous 
adaptation of policies in response to feedback from the economy, and the capacity 
to build and manage policy networks for the design and implementation of complex 
policies (see later). 
Leaving aside old dilemmas (vertical vs. horizontal policies; which criteria for 
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services etc.), ‘new’ industrial policies are increasingly and inherently pragmatic 
(Cohen, 2006; Bianchi and Labory, 2007), based on the realization that ‘there is no 
shortage of arguments against industrial policy (…) but there is no shortage of 
responses to these criticisms either’ (Cohen, 2006, 101). 
Moreover,  States  are  still  uniquely  powerful  actors,  having  access  to  unique 
resources like large budgets, personnel, specialized skills and technical assets, access 
to media and a monopoly on the use of force both inside and outside the country. 
States’ power relies on a unique source of power, i.e. political legitimation, that is 
directly linked to its special task of looking after the ‘general interest’ and after key 
preconditions for development like stability and security. Out of rhetoric, this places 
governments in a peculiar position, unlike other actors. Based on the ‘primacy of 
politics’, governments are best positioned to see and act on the complex and vital 
interconnections  between  different  dimensions:  economic,  social,  political, 
environmental,  cultural  etc.  Governments  also  interact  with  the  symbolic 
infrastructure of the society and of the economy, impacting on image, culture, values 
etc. and therefore also on collective and individual perceptions and expectations. 
At the same time private actors, even the most powerful multinational corporations, 
are ‘weak’. Their resources are limited. Their behavior is constrained by the needs of 
economic accountability. Cultural and organizational biases impact on the way they 
manage information and learning and on the contents of their decision. Adam Smith’s 
warning is, of course, still valid: ‘The statesman who should attempt to direct private 
people  in  what  manner  they  ought  to  employ  their  capitals  would  not  only  load 
himself  with  a  most  unnecessary  attention,  but  assume  an  authority  which  could 
safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, 
and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly 
and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it’ (Smith, 1976, 456). But ‘it 
is also clear that the private sector is not necessarily better informed than the State 
and, as in the case of the State, its decision-making might be biased in favor of high-
tech,  big,  glamorous  projects.  The  real  difference  in  behavior  seems  to  reside  in 
businesses’ greater aptitude to terminate bad projects’ (Cohen, 2006, 101). 
 
 
2. Industrial Policy from Government to Governance 
 
Consistently with the above mentioned pragmatism, a ‘good industrial policy’ 
must  be  seen  as  ‘a  strategic  process  of  discovery  -  coordinated  by  public  and 
private actors and based on relevant information and business opportunities - that 
results in appropriate measures being taken by the public authorities’ (Cohen, 2006; 
cf. Rodrik, 2004). In other words, pragmatism is a factor in the shift from industrial 
policies monopolized by the ‘Government’ to governance-based approaches. This 
shift is indeed fundamental in explaining the survival of the ‘weak State’ and yet it 
is often misunderstood.  
Due to cultural inertia, conventional wisdom still underlines as dominant the old 
rationalistic interpretation of government that is so dear also to standard economic 
thinking. According to this view, the truly political process is (or should be) limited 
to  problem  formulation.  Consensus  building  should  make  way  for  scientific 
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approach),  as  soon  as  the  time  comes  to  design  policy  measures  and  an 
implementation  program.  The  implementation  phase  itself  is  considered  a  non-
political, technical and potentially programmable activity. 
Contrary to this view, ‘weak states’ seem to expand the political dimension of 
their operations in their policy processes down to the implementation phases. The 
key  point  is  the  realization  that  public  policy  of  any  relevance  is  the  result  of 
interactions between public and private actors in all phases of the policy process. 
Therefore, in a governance scenario a new unit of analysis emerges, substituting 
‘government’  with  the  policy  network.  Policy  networks  not  only  diminish  the 
governments’  overload  in  both  decision-making  and  implementation,  but  make 
additional and/or rare resources available (financial, political, human and relational 
resources) and above all allow to activate and manage collective learning processes 
in situations where no consensus exists with respect to the objectives of policy, 
and/or uncertainty exists with regard to the appropriateness of instruments to reach 
the objectives. 
Policy networks are defined as ‘(more or less) stable patterns of social relations 
between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or 
policy  programmes’  (Kickert  et  al.,  1997).  The  establishment,  selection  and 
retention of relationships with other actors within policy-networks constitutes the 
essence of policy-making. Policy networks are characterized by: 
·  the interdependence between the actors and the absence (or low relevance) 
of hierarchical relationships; 
·  the variety of actors (public, private, collective, public-private etc.), each 
with their own set of objectives, values, perceptions, behavioral models and 
resources; 
·  a certain degree of stability throughout time of the relationship between the 
actors; 
·  the central role played by the interactive (learning) processes of integration 
between the objectives, the perceptions and the resources of the actors; 
·  the importance of social capital and therefore of improving the conditions 
for interaction between actors in the management of the policy network. 
 
The management of policy networks can take place at two different levels. On the 
one hand, the structure of the network can be influenced, for example, through the 
composition, the number of actors, its openness, the internal rules, the introduction of 
new actors and the exclusion of some of the present actors, etc. On the other hand, at 
the  cognitive  level,  it  is  possible  to  influence  the  perception,  the  views  and 
expectations, to anticipate the exclusion of diverging ideas and views, to facilitate 
interaction and to promote a common language, to induce collective reflection and to 
prevent  cognitive  lock-in  etc.  Therefore  the  toolbox  of  industrial  and  innovation 
policies also includes a set of ‘second generation’ policy instruments (Bruijn and 
Heuvelhof,  1997;  Bellini,  2006),  which  predominantly  (although  not  exclusively) 
impact on the cognitive dimensions of local networks in the attempt to govern their 
evolution through the formation of perceptions and expectations.  
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3. Multi-Level Policy-Making 
 
States change also because they cannot be identified unequivocally with ‘Nation-
States’. Contemporary States are a fragmented reality and government functions are 
designed and managed within complex multi-level systems. 
On the one hand, we witness the shift to higher levels of coordination or, in the case 
of Europe, of straightforward policy action based on old and new tools of industrial 
policy, from regulation to the support of industrial champions, but with the opportunity 
to act on a higher, often unprecedented scale (Bianchi and Labory, 2006). 
On  the  other  hand,  Nation  States  face  the  strengthening  of  the  local  level  of 
government  and  especially  of  meso-levels  such  as  the  Regions.  This  is  a 
phenomenon that is too widespread to be underestimated. It is not just confined to 
federal,  quasi-federal  or  would-be  federal  countries.  Devolution  processes  have 
occurred in the most diverse cases, from the UK to China. Even in traditionally 
centralized countries like Colbertian France the ‘dirigiste end to dirigisme’ that has 
characterized the 1980s and 1990s has led to a reshaping of State intervention since 
2004  with  a  much  greater  emphasis  on  the  pôles  de  compétitivité,  with  a  new 
mobilizing role for local and regional governments (Cohen, 2007). Economic and 
industrial policies are deeply affected, not only for reasons of political legitimacy 
(economic regionalism) but also because of scale appropriateness with regard to 
some key issues of the knowledge economy (Bellini, 1996; Bellini and Landabaso, 
2007; Cooke, 2008). 
Fragmentation has two (partially conflicting) consequences. On the one hand, the 
complexity of policy making is substantially increased, especially to the extent that 
the relationships between different levels of government are not pre-determined 
and ruled hierarchically. Inter-governmental politics produces longer, sometimes 
more  uncertain  processes,  based  on  bargaining,  compromises  and  political 
exchange.  As  a  result,  choices  and  outcomes  may  be  differentiated  and  favor 
‘better’ governments and more advanced regions (as the two often coincide), while 
condemning less advanced areas to a vicious circle of backwardness and inadequate 
policies.  At  the  same  time,  however,  fragmentation  feeds  a  pluralism  of 
(competing)  approaches  that  may  result  -  if  properly  managed  -  in  greater 
opportunities for policy experimentation and learning, greater flexibility and more 
opportunities of effective policy decisions.  
 
 
4. Challenges to Industrial Policy from MDM 
 
Two features of MDM are critical in challenging industry - State relationships. 
The first one is the emphasis on time: for ‘market-bubble management’ time is a 
decisive  competitive  factor.  This  marks  a  gap  between  the  need  for  time 
compression  and  speed  by  companies  and  the  longer  ‘time-to-market’  that 
consensus-building  processes  and  bureaucratic  procedures  impose  on  policies. 
While companies adapt their timing to the pace of the global market, States seem to 
expect that the economy adapts its pace to political time.  
This is only partially true. Also policy making needs to face a different sense of 
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economic  policy,  are  ‘un-planable’.  This  may  happen  either  because  of  the 
serendipity of policy effects (i.e. not all effects of a certain policy action can be 
identified and foreseen ex ante) or because threats and opportunities are exogenous 
and it is not possible to detect, not to say control, them sufficiently in advance. This 
happens, e.g., in the case of inward investment policies, where local governments, 
but even more sophisticated structures, cannot have full and timely information 
about  the  investment  plans  of  foreign  corporations.  As  a  consequence,  policies 
need to focus increasingly on preconditions that would allow to respond to threats 
or to exploit windows of opportunity as promptly as possible, one precondition 
being the setting up of cohesive, team-like policy networks with sufficient ‘social 
capital’. 
The second challenge to industry - State relations derives from the market-driven 
company’s abandoning of the closed markets in order to act on the global scale. This 
scenario  is  characterized  by  structural  instability.  Instability  is  at  the  same  time 
exogenous and therefore ‘suffered’ by companies, but is also planned and looked for 
(as in market-bubble management). The management of instability implies a dramatic 
emphasis  on  some  crucial  intangible  assets,  like  brands,  corporate  culture  and 
information  systems  (Brondoni,  2007).  All  of  those  assets  concern  cognitive 
functions and have to do with reputation, intelligence and learning.  
Intangible  assets,  however,  require  time  and  investments  to  be  established, 
maintained and updated as well as to be appreciated in their actual economic value. 
Can companies (both small and large) be expected to produce, maintain and update 
those assets effectively, timely and adequately? Of course these assets result from 
the autonomous ability of the company to design an organization and a strategic 
approach  that  meet  these  requirements,  but  some  key  components  need  to  be 
extracted from the context. Thus, large multinational corporations, far from being 
‘rootless’, are the ones that are most able to meet the challenges of globalization 
exactly because their culture and information systems are rooted in a variety of 
territories and their organization is able to combine creatively and effectively this 
wealth of context-specific, intangible resources. 
 
 
5. Sustainable Globalization 
 
If MDM literature emphasizes the role of corporate culture, both practitioners and 
scholars of industrial policy should show greater awareness of the extent to which 
local cultures impact on companies. Of course this is not a one-way, deterministic 
relationship: local cultures shape corporate cultures as much as they are shaped by 
the latter (cf. Gatti, 2007). These interactions may be virtuous as well as vicious: 
local cultures and their manipulation through symbols, place brands and images 
(Bellini et al., 2008) may provide opportunities and resources, but also handicaps 
and  constraints.  Different  cultures  of  innovation do matter to support corporate 
innovation (Didero et al., 2008) and the local ‘culture of openness’ provides assets 
to internationalization. 
In fact, contemporary debates often reflect an ‘ideology’ of globalization which is 
shaped  by  its  economic  dimension  and  which  suggests  to  policy-makers  that 
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This view implies that the role of policies must be essentially one of supporting 
economic  processes.  This  view,  however,  is  partial  and  misleading. 
Internationalization has various aspects - economic, socio-cultural, and institutional - 
which are strongly interconnected and which have to progress in a parallel or at least 
in  a  balanced  way,  otherwise  they  may  turn  into  costs  which  easily  become 
unsustainable for the area and which will block development. It is not necessary to be 
‘anti globalization’ and/or protectionist, in order to adopt a more nuanced and critical 
view  of  the  processes  of  internationalization.  Numerous  examples  can  be  given 
which  will  lead  to  reflect  on  the  concept  of  ‘unbalanced  development’  and  the 
negative repercussions it may have. On the social level, one may think of illegal 
immigration and related criminal activities. With respect to healthcare, there is the 
cyclically returning risk of ‘pandemics’, which make traveling more dangerous (with 
obvious  social  and  economic  repercussions).  In  the  economy,  internationalization 
may lead to concentration of economic power, oligopolies, disrupting competition 
etc. (Bellini and Bramanti, 2008; Bellini, Bramanti and Ongaro, 2008). 
Outward internationalization lends itself to analogous reflections. For example, 
social  and  economic  sustainability  problems  are  related  to  sometimes  massive 
delocalization  processes.  The  investments  of  small  and  medium-sized  Italian 
companies in Rumania, do not always bring about conditions for real growth for 
the  local  economies  in  the  host  country,  as  companies  are  mainly  aiming  at 
exploiting the low labor cost and the ‘tolerance’ of the local authorities.  
To summarize, the analysis and evaluation of internationalization processes and 
the accompanying policies, should not only meet the requirements of effectiveness, 
efficiency, credibility, etc., but should also adhere to requirements with regard to 
economic,  social  and  cultural  sustainability  and  we  must  acknowledge  that 
companies  often  contribute  to,  but  do  not  necessarily  produce  socio-cultural 
sustainability. 
What can be a policy framework in the era of globalization that is consistent with 
all the challenges and constraints that have been discussed so far? 
In the era of globalization cognitive internationalization has emerged: it is in the 
strict  sense  the  internationalization  of  knowledge,  i.e.  the  process  of  the 
construction  of  a  transnational  base  of  processes  which  regard  the  production, 
circulation  and  application  of  knowledge.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  the 
suppression of variety and identities, but may lead to a better exploitation of them. 
Local  knowledge  may  then  be  codified  and  made  global  and  eventually  be  re-
interpreted and re-contextualised. Through this circuit the original local cognitive 
system opens up to the global network, and the global network opens up to the 
local  cognitive  system  of  destination  (Grandinetti  and  Rullani,  1996).  In  other 
words, internationalization is viewed as a learning process which is incremental 
and not deterministic. It is based on the development of international networks of 
trust and on the accumulation of experiential knowledge, which generate the ability 
to  exploit  and  explore  and  therefore  to  create  commitment  to  external  markets 
overcoming obstacles resulting from a lack of resources and knowledge (Johanson 
and  Vahlne,  1990).  This  is  true  both  at  corporate  and  territorial  level. 
Internationalization is therefore a process which generates specific, global-minded 
‘relational capital’ and ‘knowledge capital’ and which tends to be self-reinforcing 
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Both the analytical and the normative perspectives should then lead us to revise 
the policy framework that is used to confront globalization and to escape from the 
traditional  ‘triangle’  of  the  policies  of  protection  (from  imports  and  from 
‘undesirable’ inward investments), projection (through the promotion of exports 
and  of  ‘desirable’  outward  investments)  and  attraction  (of  investments, 
technologies, tourists and inhabitants. All these policies are in fact likely to be 
ineffective or by-passed within a scenario of market-driven globalization. 
Other policies should then come to the forefront (Bellini and Bramanti, 2008). They 
may be labeled as gate policies, because they aim at planning and reinforcing global 
interface and communication functions. These functions may be embodied in tangible 
assets  (like  infrastructures  for  transportation  and  communication,  institutions  for 
international exchanges, etc.), but they crucially depend on intangible assets, such the 
‘culture of openness’ and the sum of the relational, cognitive and reputational assets 
of a global nature that are available to local actors, starting with companies. The 
sustainability of the globalization process will depend on the balance between those 
assets.  Gate  policies  may  therefore  be  interpreted  as  aiming  at  the  production, 





Contemporary,  pragmatic  industrial  policies  can  be  categorized  according  to  a 
simple model (based on Schmitz, 2007) according to the way the decisions of the 
entrepreneurs are influenced: by being challenged or by being supported. Challenging 
occurs  by  setting  targets  or  parameters  that  are  consistent  with  the  (expected) 
evolution  of  the  market  and  the  general  interest. Supporting occurs by providing 
resources or facilitating the access to them, but also by providing conditions for the 
sustainability of economic change. The basic point is that only the combination of 
challenge and support makes up an effective industrial policy. In Figure 1 we provide 
a simple matrix of different policy strategies based on this idea. Where are policies 
located that can be suitable for market-driven companies?  
In short, one may say that the low-challenge / low-support combination runs the 
risk to leave to the ‘market’ the task of finding a balanced, sustainable path of 
development. The risk may be too high and not acceptable. 
The high-challenge/low-support combination reflects the distrust of government, 
but  also  an  underestimation  of  the  new  patterns  of  policy  making  that  rely  on 
networks and governance approaches. 
The  high-support/low-challenge  is  an  unrealistic  approach,  that  clearly 
underestimates the increasing impossibility to constrain market-driven corporations 
within the horizons of closed markets. 
A  combination  of  high  challenge  and  high  support  seems  to  be  the  obvious 
solution, with all the qualifications and specifications that have been sketched in 
the  previous  pages.  One  question  still  remain  unresolved:  the  risk  of  ‘policy 
failures’,  that  is  dramatically  increased  by  the  complexity  and  speed  of  the 
dynamics within the globalization process. And yet, unlike in the case of traditional 
industrial policies, the opportunities for collective learning made possible by the 
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7. Post-Scriptum 
 
The final draft of this paper had already been finished when the dramatic outbreak 
of the global financial crisis triggered a new wave of actions and interventions by 
national governments worldwide, mostly with the aim to rescue key financial actors 
and protect industries from the consequences of the crisis. To many this appeared as 
the revival of a more traditional and explicit (and less ‘modest’) pattern of State 
intervention. It is difficult to disagree with this perception. After many years in all 
industrial  countries  the  role,  responsibilities  and  powers  of  the  State  in  the 
management of the economy was again openly discussed and acknowledged. The 
neo-liberal etiquette was set aside. A (hostile) commentator of the French President’s 
proposal of a European sovereign wealth fund to buy stakes in companies with low 
share prices and protect them from non-European ‘predators’, suggested that ‘the 
global financial crisis seems to have liberated Sarkozy to give public voice to the kind 
of  stuff  that  French  politicians  normally  save  for  late-night  drinking  sessions  - 
capitalism needs taming, the Americans are crazy, we can’t have the Asians buying 
up our businesses, why can’t the State subsidize more big industrial projects etc. etc. 
It’s all coming out.’
1 
We will need time to fully understand the meaning of these events. Nonetheless this 
resurgence of State interventionism should be dealt with caution. The reaction to the 
crisis  has  been  slow  and  clumsy  and  governments  have  appeared  culturally  and 
operationally unprepared to act - that is probably one legacy of the neo-liberal age. 
Moreover,  their  action  suffered  from  a  credibility  deficit,  that  was  only  (and 
partially) overcome by international coordination. At the same time a consensus 
problem emerged. Doubts about the effectiveness and even the legitimacy of this 
‘New Deal’ were voiced not only by the defenders of the free market ideology. 
Considering the immense amount of financial resources made available, numerous 
social and political groups challenged governments on moral and political grounds 
for not using these resources for other, more noble aims (such as social security, 
environment  protection,  education  and  research…)  rather  than  for  covering  up 
managerial failures.  
For sure, the history of industry-State relationship has not reached an end. Today, 
however, we should wait before guessing its new sense of direction. 
 
Figure 1: The Matrix of Industrial Policies 
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